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"Lawyer for Lawyers": The Emerging Role
of Law Firm Legal Counsel
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Large law firms, and many smaller ones, now engage a lawyer as legal counsel to the finn. Usually it is a lawyer in the film assigned to the
task, but some firms also have an outside legal consultant. These appointments respond to the increasingly "legal" environment in which law
firms function, in such matters as conflict of interest, malpractice risks,
the obligation of candor to courts and other government agencies, duties
of disclosure in litigation and transactions, and responsibilities among
lawyers and other finn personnel. Having legal counsel is not necessarily effective to keep a law firm out of legal trouble, however. The effectiveness of a law film's legal counsel depends on essentially the same
factors as determine the effectiveness of legal counsel to any client:
competence of counsel, seriousness of attention on the part of the client,
and good communication. Some arrangements for legal counsel to law
firms have been less than optimal in one or more of these respects.

11.

THE CHANGING LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

The need for a "lawyer for lawyers" arises from the much different
legal environment in contemporary practice of law than in an earlier era.
The change in legal environment parallels that attending all other kinds
of activity in modem settings, including businesses of all kinds, nonprofits such as hospitals and universities, wealthy individuals (concerned
with taxation and other threats to wealth), and ordinary individuals (concerned with such matters as loss of driver's licensc, divorcc, and creditor
problems). In the old days, most people lived on farms or in small towns
and cities and were governed primarily by local custom. Local custom
was given effect by common opinion, a person's standing in the community, and the sanction of bad-mouthing or ostracism. Today, everyone
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and everything, lawyers and law firms included, are increasingly governed by legal rules and subject to legal procedures.
Lawyers and law finns are governed, first of alL by the law at large,
particularly regulations addressing white-collar enterprises: the duty to
pay taxes; withholding or reporting taxes on compensation paid to others:
employment discrimination; participation in fraud or misrepresentation:
and money-laundering, which will probably soon include regulations requiring report of "suspicious" financial transactions. The regulations are
not only more numerous, they are distinctly "legal." As legal rules, they
have definite tenns, many of them technical and prophylactic. It is no
longer possible for anyone to stay within the law simply by using "common sense." Legal regulations, as practitioners must explain to clients,
go beyond common sense and indeed often do not rise to that level.
Violation of the law at large, particularly criminal law and laws addressing civil fraud, can get a lawyer in trouble not only with the usual
authorities but also in tenns of a lawyer's professional standing. Rule
8.4 of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, for example, provides that: "It is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to: ... (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer ... (c) engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation .... ,,1
Thus, the rules of professional conduct incorporate provisions of the
general law.
The rules of professional conduct themselves have been "legalized"
2
in the past forty years.
The old ABA Canons of Ethics, originally
promulgated in 1908, in both tenor and legal effect were admonitory
rather than legally obligatory.'> In contrast, the Disciplinary Rules of the
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility of 1970 are a legal
code. The Model Code was designed for adoption by governmental authority, particularly the state court systems, and was so adopted. The
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, promulgated in 1983, were
to the same effect only more so.
The 1983 Rules dropped the Ethical Considerations that had been in
the 1970 Code, and they reshaped the legal rules in light of developing
decisional law being pronounced in the cOUlis. Omission of the Ethical
Considerations in the 1983 Rules was not because ethical considerations

I.

2.

MODFL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 8A (2003).
See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future alLegal Ethics. 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1241 (1991)

(noting that "the traditional nonns have undergone important changes. One important development
is that those norms ha ve become' legalized. "').
3.

CHARLES W. \-\iOLFR.'\M, MODERN LEGAL ETIIICS ~ 2.62 (1986).
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in lav/ practice were nonexistent or irrelevant. Rather, it had proved confusing to juxtapose admonitory nonTIS, such as the Ethical Considerations, along side legal rules in a pronouncement issued by high legal 3Uthority.4 Norms pronounced by a Imv-giving source, such as a state high
court, are necessarily official and are therefore, in some sense, "legal."
Legalization of the rules governing the profession proceeded apace in the
work of the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission and further amendments
adopted by the ABA in 2003. In general, these revisions interjected additional specifications in the legal prescription of lawyers' professional
obligations.
Another dimension of "legalization" is that some provisions in the
general law effectively incorporate rules of professional conduct. Thus,
in the lavv of criminal fraud, there is at least one decision that refers to
conflict of interest as defined in the rules of professional ethics as an
element of misrepresentation. United States v. Bronston involved a
charge of fraud against a lawyer who concealed a conflict of interest
from a client.) The federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)6 can be applied in similar fashion. 7 Transaction lawyers, particularly those doing federal securities work, are well aware that
tbe Sarbanes-Oxley Act~ works in a similar way. As implemented by
regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, that Act imposes federal sanctions in support of the ethical responsibilities of corporate lawyers prescribed in Model Rule 1.13(b).9
The practice of law has thus become a pervasively regulated vocation.

4. In panicular. the horelessly vague concept of "arpearanee of impropriety." although not
among the Code's Discirlinary Rules bUI rather a Canon. was absorbed into legal requirement'
through Judicial deciSions. See WOLFRAM. supra note 3, at ~ 7.14 (citing various cases in \\'hlch the
"appcarJnce-of"-improprietv" standard was used),
65XF.2d920(2dCir. 1981)

IX LiSe ~~ 196168 (2004)
e.g,. Ljnited States \. Teitier. >\02 F,2d h()(, (2d Cir 1986) (discussing la\\'Vc'rs CL)Jl\'Icted l)f RICO \iolation in connection with scheme to defraud insurance companies on InJUI'\
claims)
x, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002. Pub. L. '\io I07-2()4. 116 Stal. 745.
<.)
See Susan P, Koniak, // hen lhl! f!/lril·h/ll'il··\ J)UI71', lli,- Bul'"s Sll'llgg,le \\'llh lht' SI:( '. 111.~
C()II~l I.. RF\' 1:':16 (2()()3j (discussing the onglling inlcraction betweenlhL' organm:d bar and the
h
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ENFORCEMEi\T ApPARATUS

Perhaps even more important. the professional obligations imposed
on lawyers can be invoked by multiple enforcement authorities. Professional misconduct that is also a crime can be prosecuted by state authorities and in some instances by the federal government. Criminal exposure
can arise from various fonns of fraud in matters undertaken for clients.
A lawyer can be at risk of being charged with obstmction of justice when
giving advice to a client who is being investigated by the authorities. In A
lawyer named Lynne Stewart was recently convicted on the basis that, in
the course of representing an accused terrorist, she allegedly gave aid to
other terrorists. 11
Then there is the risk of civil liability. In fonner times, the norms of
the legal fraternity made it very hard for an aggrieved client to prosecute
a claim for legal malpractice. No longer. Indeed, there are lawyers who
specialize in legal malpractice litigation on behalf of claimants, and some
who advertise themselves as such. Moreover, the scope of potential
claimants in legal malpractice has been widened beyond people who
wOLtld traditionally be classified as clients. The law today is that third
parties who reasonably have relied on a lawyer's opinion generally can
SLIC for damages if the opinion was rendered without exercise of reason12
able care.
Being the target of a motion for disqualification in litigation is another risk. The basis of such a remedy is typically an actual or alleged
conflict of interest. But there is also risk of being disqualified in transaction practice, where the remedy of the aggrieved party will be an injunction rather than a motion against opposing litigation counsel. 13
There is risk of being denied fee compensation, or having to return
fees already collected, for violation of the mles governing contlict of in-

10. Martha Stewart, it may be noted. was convicted of obstruction of justice for giving misleading infonnation to federal investigators. Constance L. Hays & Leslie Eaten. SteH"(/rr Found Cui/n' 0/
I_ling in Sale o/Stock, N.Y. TI'vlFS, Mar 6,2004. at AI. It is not beyond imagination that lawyers
with whom she conferred about responding In the investigation could themselves also have been
charged.
11 LaHwr is Guilty a/Aiding Termr, NY. TIi\lES. Feb. 11,2005, at AI.
12. See Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that an attorney may be
liable for a breach of his duty of due care if a lender detrimentally relies on the attorney's representation); RESTATE lENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVER~I'lG LAWYERS ~ 56 (2000) (stating that lawyers
may be subject to liability from non-clients)
13. See Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper. Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 12i:>4 rPa 1992)
(stating that courts can issue an injunction to pre\cnt an attorney from breaching hIS outy to a c:lient).
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terest 14 or those prohibiting unauthorized practice of law. IS There is a
risk of being investigated and prosecuted by the disciplinary authority.
And, in many forms of litigation and transaction practice, there is a possibility of being pursued by more than one disciplinary authority.
As summarized in the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers:
"Upon admission to the bar of any jurisdiction, a person ... is subject to
applicable law governing such matters as professional discipline, procedure and evidence, civil remedies, and criminal sanctions.,,16
Equally important as a practical matter, and often more important.
serious violations of law can have serious effects on the reputation of a
lawyer or a law finn. After all, lawyers need a continuing flow of new
engagements, and garnering new engagements today, as in the past, depends mostly on reputation. For all these reasons, lawyers today often
need a lawyer.

IV. FORMAL DESIGNATION
One of the new legal technicalities regarding a lawyer for a lawyer is
proper designation of the role itself. In my opinion, a law firm intending
to rely on legal advice should designate the adviser as a lawyer or, better
still, as "general counsel." A law finn should not designate the adviser
an ethics counselor, or ethics committee, nor "partner and counsel." or
some other equivocal designation.
There are at least three reasons for this revolving around the concept
of general counsel. First, the term "general counsel" now has a fairly
definite meaning, derived from usage for the head of the law department
of a corporation or other entity. It includes both a lawyer in independent
practice and lawyers who are not in independent practice but who stand,
as an employee of or by some other relationship to the client, as regularly
providing professional legal advice to the enterprise. In this country (as
in most common law countries), this role carries with it the powers and
rights to participate in communications covered by the attorney-client

14

REST.AITME\:T (THIRD) OJ THE LA Vi GO\TR'.:I'\(; LA WYLRS ~ 37 (2000)

15

Sl'e. e.g. Birbrower, Montalbano. Condon & frank. P.c. v. Super. Ct.. 949 P2J I (Cal

199~)

I h REST.-\TE~lEl':T (THIRD) 01 TilE L<\w GmTR'-I'.:(; L\WYI·.RS
porales several seClJons conlaJlling more detail.

~ I

(2000) That seclioll incor-
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privilege, I' to speak for a client in court, IX and, when speaking out of
court, to make immunized statements relating to litigation matters. I'}
Second, a multiple identity invites a finding that the lawyer was
something else than a lawyer in the strict sense. For example, a lawyer
might also be a business adviser or a political consultant. These vocations can be pursued by people who are not lawyers. If a lawyer has a
dual designation, it can be argued that his other legal personality was the
one involved in a specific transaction, and that in tum can nullify an
identity as a lawyer. Thus, a participant in a strategy session can later be
classified as a business adviser and not a lawyer, so that the discussions
20
in the session are not covered by the attorney-client privilege.
Third, an ambiguous designation can lead the lawyers in the client
law firm to treat the adviser as something less than as a lawyer. This
possibility is stronger where, as is often the case, the lawyer for the firm
was previously an ordinary partner. As an ordinary partner, a lawyer,
even one supposedly expert in legal ethics, has no greater authority than
any other member of the firm.
V.

A LECIAL ADVISER'S "CLOUT"

A legal adviser's effectiveness in guiding and protecting a client derives from a complex set of competencies. Technical knowledge of the
relevant field of law is, of course, essential. For counsel to a law firm,
that field is the law governing lawyers, including, but certainly not limited to, the disciplinary code. Practical judgment and wisdom are required in matters arising in representation. For counsel to a law firm, the
range of matters is as broad as the firm's practice.
Force of personality is also required, particularly in dealing with a
strong-willed client. Long ago Elihu Root is said to have observed that
"[a]bout half of the practice of a decent lawyer consists in telling wouldbe clients that they are damned fools and should stop.,,21 [n my observation that proposition holds doubly when the client is another lawyer or
group of lawyers. In some law finns the general counsel is a senior law17. Upjohn Co. v. United States. 449 U.S 383 (1981).
18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERI'Ii-iG LA WYERS ~ 4, em!. a (2000)
19. lei. § 57 (2000); compare Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 50 1 U.S 1030 (1991) (finding
Gentile violated a court rule that prohibited lawyers from making extrajudicial statements to the
press that have a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing" an adjudicative proceeding).
20 See. e.g, Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790, 792-94 (~th elr 1997) (stating that no "ombudsman privilege," defined as "an employee outside of the corporate chain of command whose job is to investigate and mediate workplace disputes," applies)
21. PHILLIP C. JESSUP, ELlHl: ROOT 133 (1938)
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yer who has full force of personality. in some Jaw fIrms the general
counsel is supported by the managing partner, who thereby brings to bear
the force of that office in support of the general counsel.
However, in some situations the general counsel has to mediate between lawyers or departments in the finn with strong independent influence of their own, Those situations are difficult for the lawyer who is
general counsel and, as a result, difficult also for the law firm.
VI. "STRUCTURAL" ETHICAL DIffICULTIES

The most difficult problems in legal ethics and the law governing
lawyers, in my observation, are not technical legal issues of professional
responsibility. A doubtful technical legal issue of professional responsibility can usually be resolved the same way similar issues are resolved
for other clients, that is, by backing off. Louis Brandeis, as a lawyer,
made the point succinctly:
[Y]our lawyers, ' . can tell you whcrc a fairly safe course lies. If you
are walking along a precipice no human being can tell you how near
you can go to that precipice without falling over, because you may
stumble on a loose stone, you may slW ., but anybody can tell you
where you can walk perfectly safe, , . ,--

Instead, the difficult issues in professional responsibility arise from
divergent interests between a lawyer and the finn or divergent interests
among lawyers or lawyer groups within the firnl. The problems are generally similar to those in dealing with a corporate or other organizational
client. As Rule 1.13(a) of the ABA ModeJ Rules of Professional Conduct recognizes, "[a] lawyer employed or retained by an organization
represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents."n As every corporate lawyer knows, an organization and its con24
stituents do not ahvays have the same interests.
Every general counsel
for a law fillll also knows or soon comes to this realization.
A very common divergence of interest is presented when one lawyer
or group in a firm wants to undertake a matter that arguably would involve a conflict of interest with another matter being handled by other
lawyers in the firm. Undertaking the new matter is an opportunity for
22. (jrOHKJ') C HAZARD. .IR .. & S\!SA\" P. KO\"j'\K. THE L.A\\ ..\ \D ETHICS OF LA\\',TR1V, 60
(3rd eJ, 1999)
D
\1o[)11. RILl'S OF PROF'l Co"D\;cr R. 1.I.3(a) (2004)
24 .0, l'la"'lc " FDIC,' () '.Hc/i·l'/?l' & MtTers. which dealt wilh all atlomey's oblig..ltioll to rewal fraud \w corp"ralc insiders. 969 F.2d 744 (91h Clr. 1992).
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one side of the firm, although attended by risk, while for the other side
the new matter presents only risk."5 Resolution of the issue might involve the finn's "new business" committee but it can also involve the
firm's legal counsel. This common dilemma gave rise to the sardonic
colloquialism that a firm's '"new business committee" is the "no business
committee" because it delivers bad news. But responsibilities of law
firm legal counsel also involve delivering that kind ofnevvs.
Another divergence of interest is less visible, but for that reason, it
can involve hidden risk. This divergence arises where many billable
hours are to be committed to a matter before any fee money is received.
The law firm is obviously at risk that some misfortune or misstep will
tum such a case into unintentional "pro bono" work-that is, the billable
hours never get paid. But the lawyer immediately handling the matter is
exposed to risk of a more personal nature in suffering waste of effort,
sometimes very great effOli, and losing credit for the billing hours in his
financial relationship in the firm.
Another set of risks arise from compartmentalization of information
within the firm. An extreme form of this is where a lawyer handling a
matter maintains secrecy of damaging facts. Another is where a combination of facts is damaging, but no one person in the firm understands the
combination. A variation is where the client of the firm is concealing
facts whose significance is not understood by the lawyer handling the
matter but could be understood by someone else in the firm.
Still another risk arises from specialization in the practice of law. A
law firm is an organization whose members are specialists to some degree. Specialization of function is a prime basis of law firm etliciency,
compensating for the bureaucratization and other conveniences of a collective organization. But specialization, especially in the extreme forms
in modern practice, means that counsel to the finn usually will not understand the issues in the underlying matter as well as the lawyer who
has the problem of professional responsibility. A lawyer ordinarily is
supposed to become a temporary expert in the underlying problem in
which the client is embroiled. When the client is itself constituted of
such experts (as the finn's lawyers will be), the theory of achieving instant expertise is stretched to the limit, and perhaps beyond.

25. A classic case is of course Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Cor!'. where the Chicago office of a law firm undertook a matter involving severe positional contl iet and then direct eontliet of interest with a matter being handled by the firm's Washington office. 5KO F2u 1311 (7th
Cir 1978).
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Practicing lawyers are familiar with the awkwardness in dealing with
clients who think they know the law. A law firm general counsel deals
with clients like that all the time.
Of course, these and other problems in practice are encountered in a
law firm's representation of the firm's "outside" clients. But the difficulties may be greater for a lawyer's lawyer. Lawyers as a class are very
sensitive to legal problems, including those arising from their own activities. General counsel for a law firm therefore has legally intelligent and
sophisticated clients. However, the clientele also has been trained to act
autonomously in dealing with legal problems. Accordingly, lawyers
have an inclination to keep their own counsel in dealing with their legal
problems. There is an apt folk saying about a cobbler's children having
poor shoes. In extreme form, the attitude of a lawyer in the client firm
can amount to denial of psychopathic dimension. Only too late may
counsel for a law firm learn what has been happening.

VIl.Co CLUS10N
The responsibility of legal counsel to a law firm is essentially the
same as that of counsel to a corporation: The client is a jural entity and
the individuals with whom one interacts are only the constituents of the
client. But the constituents are highly literate professionals, like doctors
for example, or university personneL or officers and employees of a
high-tech corporation. The difference is that the personnel in a law finD
client are legally trained.
Being an effective legal counselor to such a client requires technical
knowledge of the law governing lawyers and diplomatic skill of a high
order. This combination is not easily found. For a law firm to engage
one of its own members to handle its legal problems would seem like a
waste of valuable revenue-producing talent. For a law firm to rely on
someone less capable, however, would he to disregard the very advice it
gives to the finn's clients:
Get a good lawyer, seek advice early. and pay attention.

